This paper examines wage differentials for four types of workers employed by mediumlarge (20 or more employees) wholly-foreign multinational enterprises (WFs), joint-venture multinationals (JVs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and domestic private firms in Vietnamese manufacturing in 2009. When all sample firms were combined, unconditional JVprivate and WF-private wage differentials were 106-124 percent for managers, 78-87 percent for professionals and technicians, 56-68 percent for clerical and support workers, and 22-48 percent for production workers. Corresponding, conditional wage differentials which account for the influences of worker education and sex, in addition to firm capital intensity and size, were positive and usually significant, but smaller, 72-78 percent for managers, 32-36 percent for professionals and technicians, 23-28 percent for clerical and support workers and 15-16 percent for production workers. SOE-private differentials were all much smaller. When estimated at the industry-level, conditional WF-private differentials were positive and significant for most occupations and industries. JV-private differentials were also positive and significant in most industries for highly paid managers or professionals and technicians, but not for lowly paid clerical and support workers or production workers. Most SOE-private differentials were also insignificant when estimated at the industry level. In short, there was a strong tendency for MNE-private differentials to be larger for managers than for professionals and technicians, and a somewhat weaker tendency for differentials to be larger for professionals and technicians than for clerical and support workers.
Introduction
Casual observation and descriptive statistics indicate that foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) often pay higher average wages than domestic firms or plants in manufacturing industries of host, developing economies. Rigorous statistical analyses of plant-level data for Indonesia (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004; Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013) and Malaysia (Ramstetter 2014) , as well as firm-level data for Vietnam (Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015; Phan and Ramstetter 2007) also suggest that positive wage differentials often remain statistically significant after accounting for the influences of worker education and/or occupation, and plant or firm capital-or input-intensity and size. 1 Studies of households and internal migrants in Vietnam (Fukase 2014a (Fukase , 2014b ) also provide evidence that MNEs pay relatively high wages and attract immigrants after accounting for individual characteristics.
Of these studies, only analyses of Indonesia have been able to estimate MNE-local wage differentials for different types of workers. In Indonesia, wage differentials between MNEs and local, private plants (excluding plants belonging to state-owned enterprises, SOEs) tended to be larger for relatively high wage, non-production workers than for production workers.
Conditional differentials were also statistically significant when estimated in large samples of manufacturing plants. At the industry level, MNE-private differentials also tended to be larger for non-production workers and most conditional differentials were statistically significant in 1996, but many were insignificant in 2006. Results from large samples of Thai manufacturing plants in 1996 also indicate MNE-local plant wage differentials were statistically significant and larger for non-production workers, but do not control for worker education or other measures of labour quality (Matsuoka-Movshuk and Movshuk 2006) .
Results from a small, stratified sample of 1,500 manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms in five large Chinese cities (Hale and Long 2011, pp. 417-419) contrast somewhat.
These results are consistent in suggesting that firms with relatively large foreign ownership shares paid significantly higher wages to engineers and managers and that this differential was larger than for low-wage, ordinary workers. However, they were inconsistent because they find no significant effect of foreign ownership on wages of ordinary workers. 2 Evidence on how MNE-local wage differentials vary among occupations remains scarce, however.
We help fill this important gap in the literature by analysing data for Vietnamese manufacturing firms in 2009, the only year for which such data on wages and workers can be obtained by occupation. An important advantage of the Vietnamese data is that they allow disaggregation of non-production workers into lowly paid and highly paid occupations, whereas previous studies have usually interpreted non-production workers as white collar or relatively highly paid and skilled workers. The analysis also pays close attention to variation in MNE-private wage differentials among industries, which many of the above-mentioned studies indicate are quite important. Although the study has well-known shortcomings of cross sectional analyses, it is possible to lag key independent variables using 2008 data and partially account for simultaneity issues often thought to affect such estimates. Perhaps more importantly, a previous study (Nguyen and Ramstetter 2015) has demonstrated that ownership-related wage differentials for all workers were qualitatively similar in 2007 and 2009 . This consistency is an important robustness check because firm-level data on worker education are only available in these years and because the macroeconomic environment was good in 2007, but poor in 2009. 3 2 Similar results suggest that MNE-local wage differentials were significant for skilled workers but not unskilled workers in Mexico in 1990 (Aitken et al. 1996, p. 367-368 ).
Vietnam's economy has three important characteristics with important implications for this and related analyses. First, even after doi moi (reform) that marked the transition away from a centrally controlled economy from 1986, SOEs have received preferential treatment and traditionally been designated to control capital-intensive industries thought to be key to the country's development. Second, after the promulgation of the first foreign investment law in 1988, MNEs have also been treated more favourably than local private firms. For example, Vietnam's foreign investment laws also contain relatively few formal ownership restrictions.
As a result, the vast majority of MNEs are wholly-foreign firms (WFs). On the other hand, In this paper, we first review the literature on MNE-local wage differentials, focusing on why wage differentials might differ among occupations (Section 2). Subsequently, we describe the enterprise data used for the analysis, focusing on patterns of unconditional differentials in wages and worker skills between MNEs and private firms (Section 3). Then we test if wage differentials are statistically significant after accounting for firm size, capital intensity, worker sex, and worker education in 2009 (Section 4). Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions and suggestions for future research.
Literature review and methodology 4
There is a compelling theoretical rationale suggesting that MNEs will often pay higher wages than corresponding domestic enterprises in host developing economies. On the demand side, MNEs are often argued to possess large amounts of knowledge-based, generally intangible assets such as production technology, marketing networks and management systems. Possession of these firm-specific assets suggests that MNEs will be likely to be more efficient than non-MNEs, which is reflected by larger firm size, higher factor productivity and factor returns, and/or higher capital or technology intensity.
Many MNEs also require their employees, even relatively unskilled staff, to have engineering, marketing, and foreign language skills required to work with particular machinery and clients. In addition, many of these employees need to learn modern work disciplines, such as punctuality, tidiness and promptness, which may not be valued as highly in local firms. Firms operating in developing economies like Vietnam often face shortages of skilled workers who have both engineering, foreign language, and modern management skills.
MNEs relative unfamiliarity with local labor markets may make it more difficult for them to hire new skilled workers, or retain current skilled workers than domestic firms. This may also motivate MNEs to pay relatively high wages as an incentive to increase the attractiveness of their firms to skilled workers or to reduce turnover.
On the supply side, workers may prefer to work for locally owned firms because they are more familiar with local management practices. In Vietnam, for example, it is clear that labor market practices often vary greatly between MNEs and local firms. Nonetheless, our impression is that most Vietnamese workers are not very opposed to working for MNEs and many might actually prefer MNE employment to the alternatives. This is supported by studies which suggest that internal migrants in Vietnam often prefer to work for MNEs over local firms (Fukase 2014b) .
It is often difficult to fully account for worker quality when examining MNE-local wage differentials in samples of plant-or firm-level data. This is because very few plant-or firmlevel data sets contain information on key determinants of wages such as experience or human capital investment, which are used as in standard Mincer equations of wage determination. In this study, we are able proxy human capital investment with measure of workforce educational attainment, but we do not have data on other aspects of human capital formation or worker experience. More importantly, as in other studies of this nature, we are forced to estimate average wages at the firm level, not for individual workers. Thus, we are not modelling how wages vary among workers but how average wages vary among firms and occupations.
Some of the most comprehensive analyses of wage differentials to date have examined Indonesian manufacturing plants in 1996 and 2006 (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004 Ramstetter and Narjoko 2013) . These studies are particularly relevant here because they estimate separate
Mincer-type wage equations at the plant level for production workers and non-production workers. Non-production workers include managers, technicians, and other professionals, and generally earn much more than production workers. More importantly, the Indonesian evidence suggests that the wage gap between non-production and production workers was larger for MNEs than for private plants. 5 Equivalently, as described in the introduction, both unconditional and conditional MNE-private wage differentials were larger for non-production workers than for production workers, and differentials were positive and significant for both types of workers. For a small sample of Chinese firms in five large cities, Hale and Long (2011) also found qualitatively similar results that foreign ownership had a stronger impact on wages of managers and professionals than ordinary workers. However, their results differed from those for Indonesia because foreign ownership had no significant effect on the wages of ordinary workers. Velde and Morrissey (2003) also found a tendency for MNE-local wage differentials to be positive and larger for relatively skilled workers in five African countries.
Why do these studies suggest that foreign ownership has larger effects on the wages of relatively skilled workers earning relatively high wages? Three distinct possibilities seem conspicuous. First, skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to be able to utilize the MNEs knowledge-based, generally intangible assets MNEs possess in relatively large amounts compared to non-MNEs. Because they are better able to utilize these assets, skilled workers probably experience larger increases in labor productivity, and thus wages, by moving from private firms to MNEs, for example, than do unskilled workers. The second possibility is mundane and statistical, but probably just as important. Namely, skilled workers are by definition more heterogeneous than unskilled workers and it is thus likely that controls for labor quality such as educational background capture variation in labor quality better for unskilled workers than for skilled ones. A third possibility is that estimates of ownershiprelated differentials include monopoly rents in markets for highly valued managers and technicians or professionals, for example, because these labor markets may better be characterized as a series of bilateral monopolies rather than perfectly competitive markets.
unconditional, MNE-private wage differentials were 201 percent for non-production workers and 144 percent for production workers in 1996, and 84 and 69 percent, respectively, in 2006. When estimated in large samples of all plants combined, corresponding conditional differences were 34 and 26 percent, respectively, in 1996 and 15 and 3.5 percent, respectively, in 2006. Correspondingly, larger portions of observed, MNE-local differentials for skilled workers can probably be explained by unmeasured aspects of labor quality and labor market imperfections.
In Vietnam, it is also important that MNEs are required to pay higher minimum wages than private companies. 6 Because minimum wages affect unskilled workers more than skilled ones, they reduce the extent to which MNE-private differentials for skilled workers exceed differentials for unskilled workers. On the other hand, minimum wage requirements only affect base salaries, and domestic firms often pay higher bonuses than MNEs. 7 In 2009, private firms had the largest payrolls in the 11 sample industries (1.14 million paid workers), followed closely by WFs (1.13 million), and distantly by SOEs and JVs (0.29 million and 0.13 million, respectively; Table 1 ). WF employment was concentrated in laborintensive industries such as apparel, leather, and footwear, electronic machinery, and wood and furniture. JV employment was also heavily concentrated in a few industries, namely the apparel group, transportation machinery, and food and beverages. In contrast, private firm employment was more evenly disbursed in a range of industries, led by the apparel group, food and beverages, wood and furniture, and non-metallic mineral products. SOEs also employment was also evenly spread among a number of industries led by the apparel group, transportation machinery, non-metallic mineral products, food and beverages, the chemicals group, and the metals group.
The data, wage differentials and worker quality
As might be expected in a sample of manufacturing firms, production workers was by far the largest category, accounting for an average of just over 80 percent of all paid workers in SOEs, 82 percent in JVs, 84 percent in private firms, and 87 percent in WFs ( (Table 1) . Shares of this group were 10 percent or more for at least one category in eight of the 11 industry categories, the exceptions being three industries heavily dependent on low wage labor (textiles, the apparel group, wood and furniture). The smallest occupation was managers, and the largest mean share was in JVs (5.2 percent), followed rather distantly by SOEs (4.2 percent), private firms (3.9 percent), and WFs (3.7 percent). Relatively high manager shares (6 percent or more) were observed for JVs in three industries (apparel, chemicals, and non-metallic mineral products), for private firms in two (the metals group and general machinery, and in one for SOEs (electronic machinery).
In a large sample of the 11 industries combined, mean compensation was almost identical for production workers and clerical and support workers in private firms (13.9 million dong or about US$815 per year; Table 2 ). For production workers, WFs paid a mean of 22 percent more than private firms, while SOEs paid 38 percent more, and JVs 48 percent more. For clerical and support workers, wage differentials were similar for SOEs, 33 percent, but much larger in WFs and JVs, 56 and 68 percent, respectively. In other words, WFs and JVs paid more for their clerical and support staff relative to production workers than did SOEs or private firms, which paid no premium for clerical and support workers. This suggests that
WFs and JVs may require relatively skilled, high wage clerical and support services comparted to SOEs or private firms.
In private firms, professionals and technicians earned an average of 34 percent more than production, clerical, and support workers, while managers earned an average 2.96 times more than lowly paid production or clerical and support workers ( Table 2 ). The SOE-private differential for professionals and technicians was also about one-third, but the corresponding differential for managers was only 5 percent. In contrast, WF-and JV-private differentials were relatively large for professionals and technicians (78 and 87 percent, respectively) and highest for managers (106 and 124 percent, respectively). In other words, as in previous studies, MNE-private wage differentials were larger in highly paid occupations than in lowly paid occupations.
At the industry level, there was substantial variation in these patterns (Table 2 ). For example, production worker wage differentials were negative (indicating higher wages in private firms) for SOEs and WFs in wood and furniture, JVs in paper, WFs in electronic machinery, and SOE and WFs in transportation machinery. On the other hand, production worker wages were highest in six of the 11 industries for JVs and four industries for SOEs, but only in one for WFs. Thus, at the industry level, there was a tendency for JVs to pay production workers the most, followed by SOEs, WFs, and lastly private firms. Although clerical and support workers were also lowly paid, JVs paid the highest wages in only four industries compared to six for WFs and one for SOEs. For clerical and support workers, there were only two negative wage differentials, for SOEs in the apparel group and JVs in paper.
In the highly paid occupations, negative differentials were also sparse being observed among professionals and technicians in SOEs in the apparel group and in wood and furniture and among managers in all groups in the apparel group, and SOEs in general machinery. JVs paid the highest wages to professionals and technicians in seven of the 11 industries but the highest wages to managers in only four industries. WFs paid the highest wages to professional and technician wages in the remaining four industries and the highest managerial wages in the other seven industries. For the high wage occupations, wages in SOE exceeded WFs (technical and professional workers in chemicals) or JVs (managerial workers in paper) in only two cases.
One important weakness of the Vietnamese data is that it is not possible to measure educational attainment for each type of worker. Rather, the variable is only collected for all workers combined (Table 3) . When the 11 sample industries are combined, shares of paid workers who completed tertiary education were much higher in SOEs and JVs (18 and 17 percent, respectively) than in WFs and private firms (7.8 percent in each). SOEs also had the highest tertiary shares in seven industries while JVs had the highest in the remaining four.
Tertiary shares were lowest WFs in seven industries, in private firms in three, and in JVs in one industry. In short, there was a strong tendency for WFs and private firms to hire relatively large shares of lowly paid workers who did not finish tertiary education compared to SOEs and JVs.
Conditional wage differentials: econometric estimates
The previous literature and the data presented above suggest that the ownership-related wage differentials in the manufacturing sector are related to worker education and occupational differences among ownership groups. The literature also suggests that other firm characteristics such as size, capital intensity, and the share of females in the workforce in paid employees may also influence the extent of wage differentials. Therefore, in this section we continue with an econometric analysis to examine the extent to which ownership-related wage differentials vary among occupations after controlling for the influences of worker education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm capital intensity and size. Similar to previous studies, we estimate the following model:
where RW ijk = Average real wage of firm i of industry j for worker group k.
RO ij = Real output of firm i of industry j.
KI ij = Capital intensity of firm i of industry j, measured as the ratio of fixed capital stock over employment after deflating capital stock at a constant value.
SH ij = A share of highly educated employees in total employment of firm i of industry j (per cent).
SM ij = A share of moderately educated employees in total employment of firm i of industry j (per cent).
SF ij = A share of female employees in total employment of firm i of industry j (per cent).
DW ij = A dummy for wholly-owned, foreign-invested enterprises (wholly foreign firms -WF), taking a value of one if a firm is wholly owned FIE and zero otherwise.
DJ ij = A dummy for joint venture enterprises (JV), taking a value of one if a firm is FIE joint venture and zero otherwise.
DS ij = A dummy for state-owned enterprises (SOE), taking a value of one if a firm is state-owned and zero otherwise. = A stochastic error term.
All estimates also include vectors of dummy variables identifying six regions and as many as 29 industries, usually defined at the two-or three-digit level of Vietnam's Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC) to account for region-specific and industry-specific influences on the constant which are not captured by the firm-level variables. 13 Industry-specific effects on constants and slopes are also accounted for in more detail by estimating equations for each of the 11 sample industries separately, as well as all 11 industries combined.
Coefficients on capital intensity (a 1 ) and real output (a 2 ) are expected to be positive because capital-intensive and large firms generally pay higher wages than labor-intensive or small firms. Coefficients on the shares of highly or moderately educated workers (a 3 , a 4 ) should also be positive because they suggest higher worker quality in firms with relatively high shares. In contrast, the coefficient on the share of female workers (a 5 ) is likely to be negative because firms with a higher proportion of female workers tend to have lower average wages 13 The regions are the North Mountainous Area, Central Coast Area, Central Highland Area, South East Area, Mekong Delta, and Red River Delta (used as the base dummy). Industries are defined to have at least 2 firms of each ownership type in them.
in Vietnam and many other economies. 14 Finally, if wage differentials between WFs JVs, and SOEs, on the one hand, and private firms, on the other, persist after controlling for worker education, occupation, and sex, as well as firm size and capital intensity, the signs of the coefficients on DW, DJ, and DS (a 6 , a 7 , a 8 ) will be positive.
Because data on wages by worker occupation are only available for 2009, we focus on estimates for this year, Because of data constraints, estimates are performed in cross sections, which mean that exponential value of the coefficients on DW, DJ, and DS can be interpreted as conditional wage differentials similar to the unconditional differentials in Table 2 .
However, it is also possible that wages could influence firm's capital intensity and size, creating potential simultaneity between the dependent and independent variables. To check for the robustness of the results to simultaneity concerns, estimates of both contemporaneous and lagged specifications, where capital intensity and output are lagged one year, are compared. All estimates use robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasiticity that can be expected when firm-level, scale variables (e.g., output, capital intensity) are used.
In large samples of firms in all 11 industries combined, estimated coefficients were generally consistent with expectations, with two notable exceptions (Table 4) . First, the coefficient on capital intensity which was insignificant at the standard 5 percent level in all three non-production worker categories and in the contemporaneous specification for production workers. Second, the coefficient the share of workers with moderate education was negative and significant (managers and clerical and support workers) or weakly significant at the 10 percent level (professionals and technicians) for the three non-production worker categories, but positive and significant for production workers. In other words, firms with large shares of moderately educated workers tended to pay relatively high wages to production workers but relatively low wages to the three non-production worker categories.
Although unexpected, this result is plausible, suggesting that high school education alone leads to lower wages for non-production workers, but to higher wages for production workers.
This result is probably related to relatively high levels of educational attainment in Vietnam compared to other economies with similar per capita GDP, for example. On the other hand, larger firms, firms with relatively large tertiary shares, and firms with relatively small female shares all paid significantly higher wages to all worker classes. Goodness of fit measures (R 2   ) ranged from 0.21 to 0.34 for the four types of labor, which is typical in large cross sections such as these.
Conditional, ownership-related differentials were also positive and usually significant statistically, the sole exception being the SOE-private differential for managers (Table 4) . JVs paid the highest wages for all three non-production worker categories, 77-78 percent more than private firms for managers, 36 percent more for professionals and technicians, and 28 percent more for clerical and support workers (Table 4) . For WFs, corresponding differentials with private firms were smaller but of similar magnitude, 72, 32, and 23-24 percent, respectively. Although small, differences in JV-private and WF-private differentials were statistically significant, however. Perhaps most importantly, however, there is a tendency for mean wage differentials between MNEs (both WFs and JVs) and private firms to be larger in high-wage occupations than in low-wage occupations.
This pattern is also relatively strong at the industry level for WFs and JVs. All estimates of WF-private conditional differences were positive and significant at 5 percent or better in all 11 industries for managers, in all industries except general machinery for professionals and technicians, and in all but paper, non-metallic mineral products, and transportation machinery for clerical and support workers and production workers (Tables 5-6 ). These WF-private differentials were consistently at least one tenth larger for managers than for professionals and technicians in all 11 industries and at least one tenth larger for professionals and technicians than for clerical and support workers in seven industries.
JV-private differentials were also positive and significant for high wage occupations, but
there were a few industries where differentials were insignificant (the apparel group, paper, and general machinery) for managers or professionals and technicians (Table 5-6 ). Most JVprivate differentials were also largest for highly paid managers, but ordering among other occupations varied at the industry level. Wald tests of the hypothesis that WF-private and JVprivate differentials were equal were always rejected at the 5 percent level in large samples of all 11 industries combined and in most industry-occupation samples.
For SOEs, most conditional differences were insignificant at the industry level (Tables 5-6 ).
There were notable exceptions in food and beverages, where SOE-private differentials were positive for all four occupations, and in the chemicals group and electronic machinery, where there were positive and significant differentials for all occupations except managers. But in most industries and for most occupations, SOEs did not pay significantly more than private firms if the influences of worker education and sex and plant size and capital intensity are accounted for.
Conclusions
This paper began with a review of previous evidence that MNE-local wage differentials have often been found to remain positive even after accounting for the fact that MNEs tend to hire relatively high quality labor and to be large and capital intensive compared to local firms.
When all sample firms were combined, simple comparisons suggest that average wages were highest in joint venture MNEs followed closely by wholly foreign MNEs. Unconditional JVprivate and WF-private wage differentials were 106-124 percent for managers, 78-87 percent for professionals and technicians, 56-68 percent for clerical and support workers, and 22-48 percent for production workers. Corresponding, conditional wage differentials which account for the influences of worker education and sex, in addition to firm capital intensity and size, were positive and usually significant, but smaller, 72-78 percent for managers, 32-36 percent for professionals and technicians, 23-28 percent for clerical and support workers and 15-16 percent for production workers. Conditional, SOE-private differentials were not significant for managers and relatively small (7-11 percent) for the three other occupations.
When estimated at the industry-level, conditional WF-private differentials were positive and significant for most occupations and industries. JV-private differentials were also positive and significant in most industries for highly paid managers or professionals and technicians, but more often insignificant for lowly paid clerical and support workers or production workers.
Most SOE-private differentials were also insignificant when estimated at the industry level.
On the other hand, even at the industry level, there was a strong tendency for MNE-private differentials to be largest for managers than for professionals and technicians, and a somewhat weaker tendency for differentials to be larger for professionals and technicians than for clerical and support workers.
In this sample of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, there was thus a tendency for MNEprivate differentials to be relatively large and/or more often positive and significant for relatively high-wage occupations than for low-wage occupations. This pattern is consistent with the probability that relatively skilled workers are better able to increase productivity by using access to an MNE's firm-specific assets than unskilled workers. It is also consistent with the possibility that estimated conditional differentials include aspects of worker quality not captured by workforce education or monopoly rents earned by prized managers and technicians or professionals, for example. In short, these results provide further support for previous studies indicating that MNEs often pay significantly higher wages than local firms or plants, even after accounting important aspects of worker quality and other firm-or plant-level characteristics affecting wage determination. These results are important because they suggest there are important benefits accruing to workers in MNEs. On the other hand, the results of this and a few other studies suggest that MNE-private differentials are largest for a small number of workers in highly paid occupations and smallest for the large number of production workers. Another important pattern emerging from the data is that clerical and support workers earned substantially more than production workers in JVs and in WFs (unconditional skill premiums of 14 and 28 percent, respectively), but about the same in private firms and less in SOEs.
Although these results suggest MNE-private wage differentials are much larger for relatively few highly paid workers, we do not think this finding is strange in a capitalist labor market. And although there may be a case in favor of the argument for limiting salaries of top managers if labor market imperfections (e.g., the bilateral monopolies that often characterize markets for highly skilled workers) are judged to result in inefficiency or unfairly high wages, there is probably little rationale for treating top managers of MNEs any differently than top management in other high paying firms.
Unfortunately, the lack of data on wage and paid workers by occupation for other years makes it difficult to extend these analyses in important ways. For example, it would be interesting to investigate how changes in ownership affect wages and employment and how these effects differ among occupations. Another important question is how MNE presence affects wage levels in domestic firms and if these spillovers differ among occupations?
Unfortunately, rigorous analysis of issues raised these questions requires the use of panel data which will be impossible until data on wages and employment are collected by occupation for more years. 
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